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Summmary 
The debate over the costs of GHG emission reduction has become more com-
plex recently as disagreements over the existence of economic and environ-
mental double dividents have been added to discussions over the existence of a 
negative cost potential. We argue that basic assumptions about economic effi-
ciency, the (sub-)optimality of the baseline and the rate of technical change are 
more important than model structure, and we underline the importance of the 
timing of decisions for determining the costs. Moreover the use of a single 
baseline ‘no policy’ scenario and several policy intervention scenarios may be 
fundamentally misleading in the longer term simply because the very idea of a 
business as usual scenario is deeply problematic. Ultimately the debate turns 
on political judgments about the desirability of alternative development paths. 
Copright© 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
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Introduction 
Until recently, most analysis of the economics of climate change has focused 
on the costs of reducing GHG emissions below what they could be expected to 
be in the absence of climate policies. Given the difficulties involved in esti-
mating the benefits of mitigation (i.e. the costs of the expected impacts of cli-
mate change), there were few attempts to provide an explicit cost-benefit com-
parison (Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1992), until the recent wave of integrated as-
sessment models. Instead, the tendency has been to estimate the mitigation 
costs of reaching particular emission targets. This amounted to asking the 
question: do the costs of climate mitigation policies exceed a reasonable will-
ingness to pay to prevent possibly important but uncertain damages? Even this 
narrower question, however, gives rise to a set of issues and a range of an-
swers which make it difficult to draw unambiguous lessons for policy making. 
On the one hand, policy makers ask for clear-cut answers to such questions as 
the economic impacts of a particular carbon tax, preferably in a simple form, 
such as the aggregated loss of GDP. To this request, analysts typically reply 
with a range of heavily qualified and sometimes contradictory answers. On the 
other hand, when apparently clear-cut results do exist, but they are contrary to 
what is expected or politically palatable, policymakers often point out the 
many valid reasons for doubting the capacity of economic models to provide 
reliable predictions. Analysts respond by complaining about the ‘political 
(mis)use’ of their results. Both sides remain sceptical of each other.1
In this context, it is instructive to examine the summary for policy makers of 
Working Group III (WGIII) of the IPCC, which states that, for OECD coun-
tries: 
“Although it is difficult to generalize, top-down analyses suggest that the costs 
of substantial reductions below 1990 levels could be as high as several percent 
of GDP. In the specific case of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels, most stud-
ies estimate that annual costs in the range of -0.5 percent of GDP (equivalent 
to a gain of about $60 billion in total for OECD countries at today’s GDP lev-
                                                          
1 For discussion of the sometimes vexed relationship between energy modellers and energy pol-
icy makers, see Robinson (1992). 
 
els) to 2 percent of GDP (equivalent to a loss of about $240 billion) could be 
reached over the next several decades. However, studies also show that appro-
priate timing of abatement measures and the availability of low-cost alterna-
tives may substantially reduce the size of the overall bill. 
Such a statement may seem cautious and vague and may therefore reinforce 
doubts about the capacity of economic modelling to contribute usefully to pol-
icy debates. It is important to remember however that the rules of the IPCC 
require that the text of the summary for policy makers (unlike the text of the 
underlying report) has to be approved line by line by the general assembly in 
consultation with the relevant writing teams. In other words, the text of the 
policy makers’ summary represents a combined product of both the research 
and policy communities. And this process of creating a combined text was in 
turn based upon an underlying process whereby a large team of analysts com-
ing from many different countries, and representing a wide spectrum of view-
points, was required to exchange views and attempt to reach consensus. Per-
haps the most interesting result is that instead of claiming to provide the 
"right" answer in separate contexts (reviews, workshops, reports for national 
and international organizations, etc), these analysts recognized as a group that 
various views were scientifically legitimate and that the range of disagreement 
can be explained and is meaningful for policy making. 
In the spirit of IPCC, and of avoiding either uncritical acceptance or total dis-
trust of current analyses of emission reduction costs, we will argue in this arti-
cle that the diversity of results in costing studies can itself help us to under-
stand better the policy parameters apt to affect the magnitude of costs for 
meeting a given abatement target. In this context we will discuss the reasons 
for the variance in published costing estimates. We will then discuss the limi-
tations of existing costing studies with respect to their ability to address under-
lying issues about alternative social and technological development paths. Fi-
nally we will discuss the implications of the view expressed in the IPCC 
WGIII report that the timing of actions is in fact the most critical policy pa-
rameter and reach some general conclusions about the value of costing analy-
ses, their lessons for climate policy, and the possible directions of future re-
search. In so doing, we will argue that addressing these issues will require not 
only technical advances but also a change in the questions posed to economic 
modelling and in the framing of decision-making. 
 
I. 
I.1. 
                                                          
The basis for differences in cost estimates 
The wide range in published estimates of GHG mitigation costs over the past 
decade or so, masks the emergence of some important policy-relevant conclu-
sions that cut across the different results reported in the literature. In an at-
tempt to cut through some of the underbrush, we begin by outlining a simple 
taxonomy of costs. 
A taxonomy of costing concepts 
There are a number of different cost categories used in the GHG mitigation 
literature, which are sometimes confused with each other. They can be 
grouped into four broad categories: 
The two first cost concepts are used to analyze the technical 'margins of free-
dom' of particular policy options. The direct engineering and financial costs of 
specific technical measures represent the life-cycle cost of the technology or 
project in question (i.e. the initial cost of the measures considered plus annual 
energy and operating costs, all reduced to a net present value or levelized 
cost). In turn, these costs can be used, at a somewhat more general level, as 
input data in sectoral models that compare the relative sectoral costs of differ-
ent emission scenarios in ‘a partial equilibrium’ analysis. Such analysis is 
broader than an analysis only of direct costs but does not capture the feed-
backs between the behaviour of a sector and that of the overall economy. 
At a more general level still, estimates of macroeconomic costs try to account 
for the interrelationships between a specific sector and the overall economy in 
terms of variation of the level of the gross domestic product (GDP). Such 
analyses capture the general equilibrium effects of climate policies, though 
often at the expense of the kind of detail represented in engineering cost stud-
ies. Most macroeconomic analysis, however, does not encompass the full wel-
fare costs of mitigation policies, since welfare is not equivalent to GDP, for a 
number of well-known reasons.2 Some studies calculate welfare costs as the 
2 First, changes in the relative share of investment and consumption can change welfare without 
changing GDP levels. Second, differences in patterns of income distribution can clearly affect 
welfare, though they may not change GDP. Third, human welfare does not increase linearly with 
 
variation in welfare at the margin of a given equilibrium but they do not cap-
ture variations in welfare caused by large modifications in development pat-
terns and they tend to assume the separability of the utility of environmental 
quality from that of other goods and services, an assumption which does not 
hold for the relationship between climate and economic growth over the long-
term. We return to this issue in the last section of this paper. 
Though rather simple, this taxonomy helps to explain why the debate over the 
costs of GHG mitigation has become more complex over the past several 
years. In the early 1990s, as pointed out by Edmonds and Grubb , the debate 
was dominated by the opposition between what they called the engineers’ op-
timism and economists’ pessimism, over the magnitude of the potential for 
‘no-regrets’ policies, that is GHG mitigation measures (mainly concerned with 
energy efficiency improvements) which are economic whether or not climate 
change occurs (ie they are ‘worth doing anyway’ (Robinson et al. 1993)). This 
first generation of studies focused on ‘no regrets’ measures based on the exis-
tence of a negative cost potential (emission reductions caused by technologies 
whose costs are lower than the technologies currently in use). More recently, 
increasing attention has been paid to ‘no regrets’ measures that reflect an envi-
ronmental double dividend (the additional benefit of GHG emission reduction 
strategies which mitigate other environmental problems such as SO2 emis-
sions, urban congestion or land degradation), or an economic double dividend 
(positive effects on growth or employment of the recycling of carbon tax reve-
nues or of the technological externalities of R&D programs).  
The wider set of issues associated with these two latter sources of ‘no regrets’ 
potential has broadened the debate, and controversy about the existence and 
magnitude of these positive side-effects has blurred the original division line 
between different types of costing studies. The original difference between 
studies that were optimistic or pessimistic regarding the technological poten-
tial for emissions reduction has therefore been complicated by a separate dif-
ference between studies that are optimistic or pessimistic on the existence of 
positive side effects. Since these two sorts of optimism/pessimism are in prin-
ciple independent, the resultant situation can be represented as in Table 1. 
Some studies which are rather conservative as regards to technical flexibilities 
                                                                                                                                        
consumption. Fourth, spending money on disaster relief or environmental rehabilitation enhances 
economic growth without increasing welfare. 
 
but are optimistic about the double dividend of, say, recycling the revenues of 
a carbon tax, may produce cost figures lower than a technologically optimistic 
study which neglects this latter side effect. To put it in another way, part of the 
current debate is about the magnitude of gross costs of climate policies (ie the 
sum of the costs of implementing carbon saving technologies, including any 
negative cost potential) but another part is about the gap between these gross 
costs and the net costs (i.e. gross costs plus side effects in the form of double 
dividends). 
Double   
Dividends 
Technical Costs 
 P/O P/P
O/O O/P
optimists pessimists
optimists 
pessimists
  
Table I. Division Lines in Assessing Costs of Climate Policies 
 
We turn now to the arguments behind each of these alternative views and their 
policy implications. 
I.2. Technology dynamics, consumption behaviour 
and economic incentives 
I.2.1. The efficiency gap 
Historically, debates about energy efficiency have been framed by the distinc-
tion between top-down and bottom-up analysis. The terms top-down and bot-
tom-up suggest a distinction between aggregate and disaggregated models. 
They are probably somewhat misleading in that the differences between these 
approaches lie less in the level of disaggregation per se than in the type of dis-
 
aggregation: many top-down models, for example, account for economic ac-
tivities at a two digit SIC level and can break down consumer demand into 
many household types, which allows for testing the income distribution effects 
of policies. The actual gap between both approaches comes from the way 
technology and consumer demand are represented. In top-down models, indi-
vidual household or industrial demand functions allocate demand among a 
very limited number of commodity groups. Energy is then grouped into no 
more than two or three commodities. Bottom-up models, on the other hand, 
rely on detailed analysis of end-use energy services, focus on the integration 
of technology costs and performance data and try to ascertain the magnitude of 
the ‘efficiency gap’ between the best available technologies and the equipment 
actually in use. 
The most fundamental controversy underlying this debate between modeling 
approaches is about the size and meaning of this efficiency gap. Bottom-up 
studies tend to find that a substantial efficiency gap exists and therefore that 
there exists a potential for achieving substantial emission reductions with a 
negative cost. In other words, they suggest that market forces do not operate 
perfectly. The policy implication is that a ‘no regrets’ climate strategy could 
be pursued by removing the barriers to adoption of the most efficient end-use 
equipment: imperfect information, financing systems that impose investment 
criteria that differ from the social time preference of consumers and the oppor-
tunity costs of capital, imperfections in the energy market such as the well-
known tenant-landlord relationship, etc.  
In response, the professional reflex of many economists has been to suggest 
that this apparent ‘efficiency gap’ may not be real. The argument is that bot-
tom-up analysis may be too focussed on energy issues and that many reasons 
other than energy market failures explain why consumers may not adopt tech-
nologies which could in principle minimize the costs of providing a given 
amount of energy service. The apparent market failures described by bottom-
up modellers could be explained in terms of two other factors: (1) the com-
plexity and heterogeneity of consumer preferences (e.g. the extra satisfaction 
that a consumer derives from using her private car even when the cost per km 
is higher than in using public transport), and (2) hidden costs such as the costs 
of better information about technology options or the perceived risks associ-
ated with the capital costs of a technology. When these factors are taken into 
account, the actual efficiency gap may be much smaller than estimated by bot-
 
tom-up analysis, or even non-existent. Moreover, it may or may not be eco-
nomically efficient to close any remaining efficiency gap, depending upon the 
transaction costs of removing market imperfections. The net result of all these 
considerations is to offset the apparent negative cost potential revealed in bot-
tom-up analyses (Jaffe and Stavins 1994).3  
• This view is supported by many top-down modellers who suggest that 
this complex set of behavioural factors is captured in price and income 
elasticities emerging from econometric regressions of historical data 
sets. These data record actual behaviour and incorporate de facto all 
tangible and intangible costs including differences in consumer surplus. 
It is argued that such data provide support to the intuition that intangi-
ble costs may explain why actual flexibility in production and consump-
tion systems are lower than those postulated in bottom-up analysis.  
But this interpretation of the historical record is not the only one possible. If it 
is instead correct that markets do not behave perfectly, as bottom-up analysts 
argue, then econometric relationships simply register the consequences of 
these imperfections and provide no information about the share of the effi-
ciency gap that could be tapped through removing market barriers. Moreover, 
the other factors introduced by top-down analysts to explain why any apparent 
efficiency gap is not achieved may themselves be subject to change through 
innovation (e.g. new products that meet consumer preferences in new ways) or 
changes in consumer behaviour (e.g. driven by increased environmental con-
cern). 
The new generation of bottom-up analyses, based on the now extensive litera-
ture on energy efficiency programs and the behavioural dimensions of energy 
use, explicitly incorporates decision making behaviour and tries to incorporate 
the results of market research about consumer preferences and about the ad-
ministrative costs of public policy. The result has been to increase the esti-
mated cost of mitigation measures but such studies still show considerable 
potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements, given appropriate 
incentive policies and market reforms.  
                                                          
3 In response, a bottom-up analyst might suggest that postulating such hidden costs and transac-
tion costs amounts to an attempt to reconcile observed market failures with theories of rational 
choice, rather than a demonstration that those market failures are socially efficient. 
 
The effect of recent analysis has thus been to expose more clearly the basis of 
the differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The main point 
is that differences in results are driven less by differences in model structure 
than by differences in input assumptions about the way the economy functions, 
the relative efficiency of energy markets, and the costs of improving the effi-
ciency of these markets. 
I.2.2. The representation of technological change  
In the longer term, we need to consider not only the adoption of existing tech-
nologies but the role of innovation and technological change. In this connec-
tion, a critical factor affecting the costs of GHG mitigation is the linkage be-
tween economic incentives and technological change in a given institutional 
context. The level and type of incentives needed to achieve a given level of 
mitigation will determine not only the nature of the policy response but also 
the sign and magnitude of the feedbacks to the overall economy. For example, 
if one assumes very efficient policy signals, then the side effects of climate 
policies will be modest. 
From the top-down perspective, it is difficult to establish explicit links be-
tween production functions in economic models and trends in technology on 
the other. Since it focuses on financial flows across the whole economy, macro 
economic analysis cannot easily address the specific determinants of techno-
logical change. Instead, it captures technology at an aggregate level, in the 
form of cost functions (which allocate the sales revenue among the cost of in-
termediary inputs, wages and returns to capital) and expenditure functions (in-
direct consumer utility functions). Moreover, econometrically-driven models 
consider only price effects and do not explicitly capture non-price signals and 
potential reforms in energy markets. Finally, econometric relationships are 
calibrated on historical experience, where energy price changes were in the 
form of price shocks. This experience may not be very useful for explaining 
the effects of less abrupt and discontinuous policy measures intended to induce 
energy saving technological change. 
On the other side, bottom-up approaches, which describe technology directly, 
can easily incorporate technological innovation. However, bottom-up analyses 
do not capture the macroeconomic feedbacks and linkages described in top-
down analysis since they focus at a different level of analysis altogether. The 
 
new generation of bottom-up analysis described above does begin to link be-
havioural and technical analysis but still at a fairly micro level. 
There is as yet little experience in combining these two approaches in fully 
interactive modelling analyses. Hybrid models which couple bottom-up and 
top-down modules typically make use of exogenous and ad hoc input assump-
tions upstream from the macroeconomic module; but these models can then 
confront unsolved internal consistency problems when large departures from 
business as usual trends are to be considered. 
Put another way, both bottom-up and top-down descriptions of technology and 
the causes of technological change make sense but each captures a different 
aspect of that change. If these translation difficulties are clearly understood, it 
becomes clear that there is no a priori reason that the two modelling ap-
proaches will give different results. Whether they do or not depends largely on 
their respective input assumptions.  
The potential for similar results can be exemplified by considering top-down 
models which account for technological changes via two parameters: (1) the 
autonomous energy efficiency index (AEEI), and (2) the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the aggregate inputs to household and firms. AEEI is a function 
of time (a proxy for all the reasons why some energy efficiency improvements 
will be embedded in technological trends) and suggests the rate at which the 
penetration of new technologies may change the energy intensity of the econ-
omy. The elasticity of substitution is a function of the relative prices of inputs, 
and allows measurement of the degree to which capital or labour can be substi-
tuted for energy as energy prices rise relative to these other inputs. The values 
of AEEI and elasticity of substitution can be adjusted to provide results that 
match those frequently suggested by bottom-up modellers. Thus a relatively 
high value for AEEI, say a 2% decline per year, and a relatively high value for 
the elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and other factors of produc-
tion (labour, capital), could lead top-down simulation results in which the cost 
of carbon emission stabilization, and even a 15-30% reduction, were below or 
close to zero. 
On the supply-side, top-down modellers can resort to optimistic views about 
the future costs of carbon-free ‘backstop’ technologies, which would have the 
effect of producing low or negligible costs in the very long-run, as in the inte-
 
grated top-down low emission supply system (LESS) analysis carried out for 
Working Group II of IPCC (Edmonds et al, 1994). 
In a similar way, the new generation of bottom-up models that incorporate 
explicit treatment of behavioural and implementation factors could adjust 
these factors so as to significantly increase the overall cost of mitigation 
measures, bringing them closer to typical top-down results. Or the cost of new 
energy supply technologies in the long-term could be increased. The point is 
that the results are driven less by the differences in models structure than by 
the differences in input assumptions about the way the economy functions.  
In fact, the difference between top-down and bottom-up baseline results has 
narrowed considerably over the past 15 years, as illustrated, for example in the 
difference between the reviews of Caputo (1984) and Grubb et al. (1993). In 
general, top-down forecasts of future energy demand have dropped considera-
bly, while bottom-up projections have increased somewhat less. But important 
differences remain and it seems clear that the future research agenda will need 
to address the gap between these two complementary approaches to describing 
technological change. In this connection, it is likely that an important issue 
will be the role of expectations and incentives in inducing technological inno-
vation, and how this can best be represented in a modelling framework.  
So far, both top-down and bottom-up models describe technical progress by 
means of purely exogenous assumptions. This means that, in the models, the 
cost of technological change is independent of the level of abatement and of 
prices. This of course is misleading. On the one hand, it is unlikely that learn-
ing by doing and the increasing returns to innovation pointed out in the litera-
ture on technological change would have no impact on the costs of carbon-
saving technology. On the other hand, it is also inappropriate to interpret the 
results of the more optimistic scenarios as suggesting that R&D programs will 
induce a costless and effortless trickle-down of carbon- saving technology. 
I.3. Analyzing side-effects: the economic double 
dividend 
Much of the concern over the macroeconomic implications of climate policies 
has been driven by the observation that the level of carbon tax needed to re-
duce CO2 emissions significantly is such that they would induce important 
 
price distortions and changes in investment structure. Because it is inconsis-
tent to treat such a carbon tax without internal recycling of the tax revenues, 
different studies made different assumptions about how the tax revenue would 
be recycled. Many empirical models explored the hypothesis of a lump-sum 
recycling while others, mostly in Europe, assumed targeted recycling policies 
aiming at decreasing payroll taxes, income taxes or corporate taxes (the choice 
usually depending on the internal context and the overall fiscal policy of the 
country in question). This was the case for example for the QUEST simula-
tions by the European Commission or for national studies in most of the Euro-
pean countries such as Germany, France, and the K.  
On the theoretical side, analysis by Bovenberg and Van der Mooij (1994) and 
Goulder (1994) explored more systematically the conditions under which a 
double dividend was likely to occur. Without entering into the details of this 
discussion, we can say that a double dividend occurs when the marginal distor-
tionary effect of a carbon tax is lower than the distortionary effect of the taxes 
for which it is substituted and when the amount of overall fiscal burden re-
mains constant.4 An important point is that the existence of these conditions 
depends on parameters far beyond the energy field: 
• preexisting energy tax levels  The difficulty here is that the distortion-
ary effect of these taxes cannot be directly derived from their observed 
level. If energy taxes are seen primarily as a way to increase govern-
ment revenues, then the marginal cost of a carbon tax will be high (in-
creasing as the square of the tax); and if conversely energy taxes are 
viewed as a way to internalize environmental costs and congestion costs 
or to fund the maintenance of transport infrastructure, the welfare costs 
of pre-existing taxes will be considered low (or even negative if total 
external costs are higher than tax revenues).  
• the organization, content and funding of the welfare system  Many 
European countries finance not only their public administration system 
but also their health system, social security and teaching system by rais-
ing funds from taxes levied directly or indirectly on wages: the resulting 
difference between the labour cost and the net wage for the employee 
may be a cause of structural unemployment. The fiscal system is very 
                                                          
4 Without this constancy hypothesis, the double-dividend may turn into an incremental burden if 
the average efficiency of public investments is lower than the efficiency of private investments. 
 
different in the USA and in Japan as a practical translation of different 
views of social organization.5 This can significantly alter the potential 
for a double dividend from a carbon tax. 
• the pre-existing level of unemployment and the functioning of the labour 
market  Although most Keynesian models are 'pessimistic' with regard 
to responses to changes in prices and technology, they often suggest a 
short- and medium-term positive effect on employment and growth from 
recycling a carbon tax through lowering payroll taxes (high enough to 
more than offset the cost of mitigation). As unemployment decreases 
this effect disappears and the double dividend vanishes. This also ex-
plains why GCE models which assume perfect functioning of the labour 
market tend to suggest that there are positive net costs of a carbon tax 
(even if this net cost is generally low in these models because they as-
sume generally higher technological flexibility).6 
Another determinant of the double dividend over the long run is the labour, 
capital and material intensity of technical change and the impact of energy 
saving technological innovation on overall productivity (productivité globale 
des facteurs). One interpretation is that of Jorgenson (1984) and Hogen and 
Jorgenson (1990) who find a negative correlation between energy prices in the 
US economy and technological change (in terms of global productivity). How-
ever, this result seems inconsistent both with the parallel observation that, his-
torically, higher prices also lead to accelerated technological innovation which 
embodies increased energy efficiency, and with the results of cross-sectional 
analysis which suggest that high levels of industrial competitiveness are corre-
lated, at least in part, with energy efficiency since energy efficient processes 
tend to be underpinned by better control systems and a more efficient use of 
material flows. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is that global pro-
ductivity is correlated with many other factors than the characteristics of tech-
nology. Reductions in overall demand or growing uncertainties, due for exam-
                                                          
5 For a provocative analysis, see Krugman (1994). 
6 In other words, Keynesian models correspond to the O/P quadrant of Table 1, while GCE mod-
els correspond to quadrant P/O. In this case the double dividend optimism of the Keynesian 
models more than offsets their technical costs pessimism, while the double dividend pessimism 
of the CGEs more than offsets their (relative) technical costs optimism. However, a greater gap 
exists between those analyses that are pessimistic, and those that are optimistic, on both fronts.  
 
ple to oil shocks, can result in a lower level of productivity even if the techni-
cal efficiency of energy-using equipment is increasing. 
Generally modelling exercises capture price induced technical change as the 
movement of a combination of factors along the frontier of a given production 
function; they do not capture the changes in the coefficient of this function at 
given point in time induced by long-term price signals. However, it is unlikely 
that significant price signals will bias technical progress in the energy field 
without any impact on the shape of the production functions. Two questions 
are critical at this level: what will be the capital intensity of such a change, 
and to what extent a shift towards more labor-intensive technology is required 
by more energy saving technology? 
The result of these factors is that analysis of the potential for an economic 
double dividend turns in part on what is the appropriate description of micro-
economic behaviour. In order to address the economic double dividend issue, 
we need to understand better the interplay between parameters such as changes 
in the use of equipment, changes in the structure of final demand in the direc-
tion of less energy-intensive goods, variation of the level of risk taken by an 
entrepreneur when employing a worker due to changes in labour market regu-
lations etc. All such factors will affect the substitution between energy and 
labor, even without any change in the characteristics of the production tech-
nique itself. Further progress in knowledge can be achieved only through a 
more detailed description of labor markets (does a decrease of payroll taxes 
lower the labor cost or is it transformed into an increase in net wages? What is 
the role of informal and "black" economies?) and of the employment decisions 
of entrepreneurs in an uncertain market (do variations in final demand increase 
the risks of an employment decision when the wedge between labor costs and 
net wages is high?). An important issue is whether climate policies are apt to 
reduce the level of uncertainty an entrepreneur has to cope with or, on the con-
trary, will these policies induce such uncertainty that the overall effect may be 
a decrease in productivity. 
I.4. 4. The Suboptimality of the Baseline 
The methodological and technical differences discussed above reflect different 
views about the efficiency of energy markets (size of short-term 'no-regrets' 
 
potentials, induced technical change), the degree of distortions due to preexist-
ing fiscal systems, and the existence and meaning of distortions in labour mar-
kets. These differences result, at least in part, from policy and value judgments 
about each of these parameters. A useful way to summarize these differences 
is in terms of how they are conveyed in the definition of the baseline scenario 
constructed for costing analyses. The interpretation of the baseline scenario 
directly influences the way the 'no regrets' issue, which is of direct relevance 
for short-term policy decisions, is conceived. 
The linkages between the discussion of ‘no regret strategies’ and the choice 
of’the baseline can be summarized in very simple graphical form. (see Figure 
1). Let curve F(Q,E) representing the theoretical production frontier which 
represents the trade off between economic activity (Q) and emission reduction 
(E). For a given economy at a given time, each point on this curve shows the 
maximum size of the economy for each level of emission reduction; put an-
other way, it shows the maximum emission reduction for each level of eco-
nomic activity. From the point of view of cost analysis, a key consideration is 
what is assumed about the location of the reference or baseline scenario with 
respects to this curve. 
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Figure I. Relationship between economic activity  
and emission reductions 
 
 If the baseline scenario assumes the economy to be located somewhere on the 
production frontier (curve F), it is clear that there is a direct trade off between 
economic activity and the level of emissions. In effect, all increases in emis-
sion reduction (moving down the surface of the curve to the right) will de-
crease economic activity (ie increase costs). That is, there is no potential for 
‘no regrets’. Moving up to the left on the curve will increase economic activity 
but also increase emissions. In such a context, an appropriate policy mix can 
minimize the net cost of lower emissions but can never offset it totally (Goul-
der, 1994).7 Conversely, in a baseline scenario which describes an economy 
below the production frontier represented by curve F, ‘no regrets’ strategies 
are possible. Under these conditions, emissions can be reduced without reduc-
ing the size of the economy (ie without increasing overall costs) and, possibly 
can enhance economic activity.8
The critical question is then whether the reference or baseline scenario to 
which emission reduction scenarios are compared is on this frontier or not. 
Assuming that some ‘no regrets’ potential exists implicitly suggests that any 
baseline scenario is below the frontier and that appropriate policies would 
move the economy up towards that frontier. In this sense the economic debate 
is as much about the location and characteristics of the baseline scenarios as it 
is about the nature and costs of specific emission reduction measures. If the 
economy is not on the production frontier, then it should be possible to move 
from O to a point C between A and B by using the surplus derived from remov-
ing market imperfections to increase both economic product and emissions 
reductions. 
                                                          
7 Goulder, L.H. (1994) "Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader's Guide". 
50th congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Session I "Green Taxes and the 
Rest of the Tax System", Harvard University, 22-25 August 1994, 35 p. 
8 Of course it would also be possible to move from O to a point above and to the left of point B, 
thus increasing economic growth and also increasing emissions; this means that the economic 
surplus gained thanks to the removal of inefficiencies (i.e. moving from O to curve F) will be 
devoted to improving environmental quality only if there is a collective preference and political 
will to do so. It could also be possible to move to a point below and to the right of A (reducing 
both emissions and economic activity) if the surplus is devoted to very high investments with a 
low return and a very low efficiency in terms of environmental quality improvement. This could 
occur in the case of misallocation of efforts for a given level of concern for environmental qual-
ity. 
 
The situation is of course complicated by the facts that, on the one hand, the 
production frontier is itself not static but changes over time,9 and, on the 
other, that the existence of market and institutional failures that give rise to a 
‘no regrets’ potential is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the devel-
opment of strategies to realize that potential. Achieving the potential also de-
pends on the existence of significant political desire to reduce emissions, and 
the availability of strategies that cost less to implement than the savings they 
create by eliminating market and institutional failures. Moreover, in many 
fields of public policy making, countries will consider climate policies in a 
multi-objective decision-making framework, whereby GHG emission reduc-
tion policies are likely to be a by-product or joint product of policies devel-
oped primarily for other reasons. The result is that, in practice, the methodo-
logical and technical debate over the existence of 'no regrets' potential is over-
shadowed by other factors of perhaps more immediate relevance to decision 
making. However, this does not prevent that debate from being used strategi-
cally by various interest groups or stakeholders to advance their views.10
II. 
                                                          
Beyond the efficiency gap:  
the multiplicity of baselines 
We have focused so far on the relationship between the costing of climate 
policies and the various types of suboptimality that may be embedded in the 
baseline scenarios. This is the critical issue in assessing GHG mitigation costs 
over the short and medium term. Over the long term, however, the focus 
changes and more emphasis needs to be placed on the question of the struc-
tural content of the long term baseline scenario and its predictability. The na-
ture of that baseline may be much more important in determining GHG emis-
sions than any energy policy measures, and different assumptions about the 
baseline will alter mitigation costs in a fundamental way.  
9 In fact, much of the debate over this issue arises because more optimistic assessments of emis-
sion reduction potential implicitly compare the present state of the economy to some possible 
future production frontier, assuming technological change that moves the frontier outward over 
time. 
10 For an extensive discussion of the ‘strategic’ use in the policy arena of energy demand fore-
casts in several industrialized countries, see Baumgartner and Midttun (1987). 
 
Let us begin with a rather trite observation: GHG emissions over the long run 
depend not only on the rate of economic growth measured in dollars, yen, 
pounds, deutschmarks or francs but also on the material content of the con-
sumption or production activities behind this economic growth. Experience to 
date shows to what extent that countries with rather similar income levels may 
have very different levels of energy consumption per capita or transportation 
requirements. While part of these differences is due to factors such as climate 
and geography, comparative studies (Martin 1992, Darmstadter et al. 1977) 
also suggest the importance of underlying development patterns. Five main 
determinants seem to be at work at this level:  
technological patterns (overall consistency of technological systems in en-
ergy, transport, construction, agriculture); 
consumption styles (housing patterns, leisure, durability and rate of obso-
lescence of goods, distribution of income); 
• the geographical distribution of activities within a given area (human 
settlements, nature of urban forms); 
• structural change in industry (shares of high and low energy-intensive 
industries and services, value added for a given material content); and 
trade patterns and international specialization. 
These factors are in some way captured by changes in model parameters such 
as the structure of household expenses, the distribution of the value added or 
import-export elasticities. This type of treatment however, which is convenient 
for analyzing economic or fiscal policies over the short term, or for developing 
medium-term scenarios framing sectoral planning and policies, is much less 
relevant for time horizons where it is less acceptable to assume continuation of 
the speed and direction of historical trends in the main determinants of devel-
opment patterns. Three examples will illustrate the difficulties of predicting 
such future developments: 
• A given amount of value added produced by the chemical or steel indus-
tries may correspond to very different levels of material inputs and out-
puts depending upon the level of sophistication of the final product. In 
fact, the energy intensity of many industrial processes has dropped rap-
idly (a process sometimes called dematerialization) over the two past 
decades as the information intensity of the economy has increased. 
 
There is no way to predict today whether this trend will reach an as-
ymptote and level off, or not. 
• Trends in the share of household budgets devoted to transport express 
changes in mobility and transportation patterns which depend on the 
evolution of the density of towns; on the distance between working 
places, leisure areas and commercial areas; and on the supply of trans-
portation infrastructure at the disposal of consumers. These important 
feedbacks within the complex relationship among policy, consumption 
and technology in this sector are difficult to predict. 
• Developing countries could, in principle, follow a development path 
which ‘leap-frogs’ the most energy-intensive (and environmentally 
damaging) stages of industrialization historically passed through by 
western countries. The potential for such a path depends in part upon 
the removal of a set of constraints (indebtedness which prevents invest-
ing in capital-intensive transport infrastructures; tariff and non-tariff 
trade barriers; etc) and this will be a critical factor in determining 
global GHG emission rates after the beginning of next century. 
The difficulty in predicting the evolution of development patterns over the 
long run stems in part from a lack of knowledge about the dynamic linkages 
between technical choices and consumption patterns and about their interac-
tions with economic policies and economic signals over the long run. It also 
derives from more general uncertainties about political, social, religious and 
other factors, which in turn are linked to fundamental questions about inten-
tionality, meaning, power, trust, credibility, social organization, etc. While 
many of the social sciences and humanities address these latter issues such 
information is not typically available in a form easy to process in a numerical 
model. The result is that modellers are reduced to generating alternative sce-
narios that express some subjective (or more formalized) judgment about how 
such qualitative factors might influence those variables that can be expressed 
in terms of the model. 
Perhaps equally challenging is the difficulty posed by self-reinforcing loops 
among technical choices, consumer demand and the geographical distribution 
of activities and human settlements. Such loops give rise to a time dependence 
of development patterns rather similar to the one which emerges from litera-
ture on technical innovation (learning curves, economies of scale, increasing 
 
informational returns, positive network externalities) and which may result in 
“lock-in” effects and a resultant foreclosure of options (Arthur 1988). Resort-
ing to Bayesian approaches to cope with the resultant uncertainty could be 
misleading for decision making because this is a case of ‘endogenous uncer-
tainty’ where the probability of certain states of the world to occur in t + n is 
determined by decisions in t. The point is that alternative baseline scenarios 
represent quite different and internally consistent patterns of development due 
to the long-term consequences of current decisions and current behaviours and 
to the collective expectation regarding time t + n prevailing at time t. 
In turn, these decisions, behaviours and expectations are part of a particular 
sequence of events, and cannot simply be combined with the components of 
other such sequences to produce an average or most likely sequence. Given the 
high research and development costs involved in a new automobile engine, it 
is unlikely for example that, in a no-climate-policy scenario, R&D and D risks 
will be incurred simultaneously on electric cars, 2l per 100km gasoline en-
gines and biofuels engines. As in the past example of the dominance of the 
four-stroke example over the two-stroke engine and the promising rotary mo-
tor, the first innovation which succeeds in attracting significant R&D can pre-
clude the development of other alternatives, however attractive they may be in 
principle.  
These considerations strongly suggest the need to work on the basis of several 
baseline scenarios. These would not be simply scenarios with high, medium or 
low versions due to various assumptions regarding exogenous parameters such 
as GDP growth or oil prices, but instead would represent alternative baselines, 
each characterized by different assumptions about development patterns and 
innovation. The point is not to predict what long-term outcomes are most 
likely (an exercise at which few have been successful (Ascher 1978, 1990)) 
but to explore the economic and technological feasibility and costs associated 
with quite different development paths.  
While there exists a history of attempts to explore unconventional energy 
paths, sparked in the 1970s by the arguments of Amory Lovins (1977) about 
‘soft energy paths’, most of the GHG mitigation costing literature, of both the 
top-down and the bottom-up kind, has focused upon developing single base-
line ‘no climate policy’ scenarios and several policy or intervention cases. In 
fact, neither approach has been effectively used to explore the issues of under-
 
lying development paths, technological change, irreversibility and bifurcations 
through the analysis of multiple baseline scenarios. 
A strong theoretical background can be found for the study of several baseline 
scenarios in the works of advanced economic theory about the existence of 
multiple economic equilibria generated by different sets of expectations and 
sequences of choices. This issue has been raised by works on technological 
change but can also profit from insights from many other fields of economic 
theory and decision theory: ‘sunspot theory’ (Azariadis and Guesnerie 1986), 
self-fulfilling prophecies (Henshell ), ‘common knowledge’ and ‘conventions’ 
(Lewis 1969, Dupuy, 1989), coordination games (Schelling 1960) and repeated 
games (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). 
The implication for the assessment of the costs of GHG mitigation is that any 
results are meaningful only at the margin of a given baseline scenario and that 
there are as many cost assessments as there are potential baselines. This would 
be true even if all these baselines are assumed to be on, or below, the produc-
tion frontier over the long run (ie this finding is independent of relative merits 
of the top-down and bottom-up arguments about the efficiency of the base-
line). As a result, comparing a single baseline ‘no climate policy’ scenario 
with several policy or intervention cases can provide only a very partial view 
of the matter. Bifurcations in development patterns and technological change 
could well generate alternative scenarios whose emission levels may differ 
more than the difference between a baseline scenario and its associated policy 
case. 
It might be argued that a generalized cost-benefit analysis could in principle 
provide a ranking of alternative baseline scenarios. However, even if we leave 
aside the question of the potential qualitative incommensurability of different 
baselines, this would require some reliable information on several (and mutu-
ally exclusive) baskets of goods, services and techniques. More fundamentally 
it would require the assumption that consumers and policy-makers have a 
complete set of preferences with partial ordering and transitivity. This transi-
tivity condition is likely not to be respected here because the consumer prefer-
ence is not about each good in a given context (the utility attached to driving a 
car to go to work) but on each good for alternative states of the world (the util-
ity attached to driving a car in many types of urban areas with various endow-
ments of public transport). 
 
The upshot is that bifurcations toward alternative scenarios are not at random; 
they are generated, generally in passing, by policy decisions and behaviours 
which have little or nothing to do with energy and environmental policies (ur-
ban planning, effect of advertising on consumption, etc.). This has two impli-
cations for the use of existing cost assessments in negotiations about the im-
plementation of the Berlin mandate: (1) a baseline scenario that gives rise to 
lower estimates of emission reduction costs cannot be interpreted as being 
economically superior to other baselines (since achieving this baseline de-
pends on policy decisions, and associated costs and benefits, that have little to 
do with energy or environmental policy); and (2) given the 'multi-purpose' 
nature of alternative baselines, it is very difficult to allocate costs so as to de-
termine the incremental cost of reducing GHG emissions.  
A simple historical example helps to illustrate that these problems are far from 
being simple intellectual fancies. If the climate debate had emerged in 1973, 
just before the decision to launch the nuclear program in France, two possible 
baseline scenarios could have been considered: 
• the first without the nuclear program, and consequently a higher CO2 
emission level; in this case the projected cost of the nuclear program 
could have been included in the estimated emission reduction costs; and 
• the second including a nuclear program; the emission reduction re-
quirements would have been lower, but paradoxically the costs of an in-
cremental emission reduction of, say, 20% would be far higher. 
Beyond the fact that assessing the relative costs of two totally different energy 
systems is technically difficult (for example in the non-nuclear case France 
would not have developed electrical heating to the degree it did), the critical 
point is that although the nuclear choice would not have been made, in prac-
tice, purely for climate-related reasons: in any negotiation, the French admini-
stration would have tended to argue the contrary so that this program would 
have been considered as a specific contribution to a collective climate policy. 
 
III. Costs, timing and targets: towards a new 
decision making framework? 
The preceding discussion may induce the feeling that, given the uncertainties 
about baseline scenarios and cost assessments, no guidance for policy-making 
can be derived from existing mitigation costing studies. We would argue, on 
the contrary, that a recognition of the limitations of both bottom-up and top-
down approaches to estimating the long-term costs of GHG mitigation helps to 
frame better the decision-making problem raised by climate change. We turn 
now to the question of the timing of the policy response to climate change, and 
the implications of the arguments presented in this paper for research and pol-
icy. 
Despite the differences in specific results, most cost studies suggest that the 
key short-term factor is the potential for ‘no regrets’ savings through increased 
energy efficiency. While debate continues as to the size and achievability of 
that potential, it is clear that improving energy efficiency is likely to be the 
most cost-effective strategy in the short-term. 
In the longer term, the emphasis shifts to a focus on low carbon energy 
sources, and the structure of technological change and alternative development 
paths. A key issue here is the need to consider the long-term implications of 
ongoing decisions about infrastructure and long-lived capital stock that will 
affect GHG emissions for many decades. Since replacing capital stock before 
the end of its economic lifetime will significantly increase mitigation costs, 
this suggests the need to consider investment patterns carefully as that stock is 
turned over. 
Another critical influence on mitigation costs is the expected growth in the 
underlying consumption activities that give rise to GHG emissions. When tar-
gets are set for levels of emissions calculated from a given benchmark year, 
growth in baseline emissions over time increases the gap between baseline and 
target emissions. The higher the rate of growth, the bigger the emission reduc-
tions that are required to meet the target. This tendency is counterbalanced if 
the baseline scenario embeds optimistic assumptions about the availability of 
new energy technologies in the long run, by incorporating some decoupling 
between economic growth and emissions, by assuming a high responsiveness 
of consumption to price and non-price signals, by including induced technical 
 
change which is biased towards low carbon-intensive techniques, or by assum-
ing a great deal of flexibility in the system. These counter tendencies may 
even be high enough that costs over the long run may be lower than over the 
short term.  
All this indicates the importance of the timing of mitigation measures. In dis-
cussing timing issues, two different insights need to be considered simultane-
ously: 
• First, in considering the evolution of low carbon futures, there is a dis-
tinction between the transition period (the period of transition away 
from a carbon-intensive energy system) and the backstop period (the pe-
riod after that transition is achieved). The transition period is character-
ized by a pre-existing capital stock and limited technological options for 
replacing existing technologies with carbon-free technologies. The 
backstop period is entered after sufficient time elapses to allow the en-
tire capital stock to be replaced by available carbon free backstop tech-
nologies at the end of the economic life of existing equipment. Over this 
backstop period the cost of carbon-free technologies places an upper 
limit on how great the costs of reducing carbon emissions can be. Suc-
cessful R&D that accelerates the availability of carbon-free technolo-
gies can reduce costs in the backstop period. Over the transition period 
costs are directly function of the pace of the abatement. If technological 
progress will significantly reduce the costs of emission reduction, then 
delaying such reduction until that technology is available, and capital 
stock is at the end of its economic lifetime, may reduce costs (Wigley et 
al, 1996). 
• Second, and in the opposite direction, the inertia due to existing equip-
ment and more fundamentally to the interplay between preference 
curves and infrastructure endowments would also play the role of an 
important cost multiplier if after a long ‘wait and see’ period, it be-
comes necessary to accelerate abatement (Hourcade and Chapuis 1995). 
Both the technical cost and welfare costs will be higher for the case of 
an excessively delayed action if energy-intensive investments in long-
lived capital stock have been made in the meantime. For example, shift-
ing towards a low energy-intensive transportation systems (railways and 
bicycles) will be far easier in a medium sized and dense town than in 
huge conurbations designed around the automobile. 
 
As a result, the choice of abatement paths involves balancing the economic 
risks of rapid abatement now (that premature capital stock retirement will later 
be proved unnecessary) against the corresponding risk of delay (that more 
rapid reduction will then be required, necessitating premature retirement of 
future capital stock). Whatever position is taken on this issue, considerable 
effort should be expended on generating the right signals today to direct future 
technological innovation, on lowering transaction costs which create a barrier 
for no regrets measures, on implementing mitigation measures that are eco-
nomic at the point of turnover of capital stock, and on the implementation of 
new infrastructure, especially in developing countries and economies in transi-
tion. 
Perhaps the most general conclusion that can be reached by examining the 
methodological issues underlying GHG mitigation cost studies is that esti-
mates of the costs of mitigation of GHGs depend critically on policy decisions, 
and assumptions, expectations and conjectures about social and technological 
developments, that have little to do with climate policy. We have tried to illus-
trate the nature of some of these dependencies in this paper. In this sense, the 
GHG mitigation issue is tied up in a set of more general issues that will heav-
ily influence not only the costs but the very availability of mitigation meas-
ures.  
This has both methodological and political implications. On the methodologi-
cal side, there is a need to move to more general analyses of alternative devel-
opment paths which represent alternative baseline configurations of social be-
haviour and technological change. Given the difficulty in predicting the future 
over the very long run there is a need for tools transparent enough to sustain 
‘backcasting’ exercises (Robinson 1988, 1992) that explore various views in a 
consistent way. On the political side, it is useful to remember that a model is 
no more (and no less) than a communication and negotiation tool for informa-
tion about possible future conditions coming from various fields of knowl-
edge. As a result, there is a need to recognize that ultimately a political judg-
ment will need to be made on the desirability of alternative development paths. 
This is a judgment that cannot be made by costing experts. 
Of course mitigation costs, no matter how broadly conceived, are only one part 
of the picture. It is also important to consider the benefits of mitigation, that 
is, the costs or damages associated with climate change impacts. A truly inte-
grated assessment of climate policy would include both the costs and benefits 
 
of mitigation in the analysis. Given the importance of the underlying methodo-
logical and substantive assumptions discussed in this paper, given the extreme 
instability of very long-run predictions, and considering need for a sequential 
decision-making framework, the purpose of such an integrated assessment 
should not be to determine the real cost-benefit ratio or net benefits of climate 
policies over the long run. Instead it should be to make explicit the competing 
world-views underlying the analyses and to help point out what uncertainties 
and what controversies really matter for climate policy decisions.  
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